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IMPLICIT RACIAL BIASES IN PROSECUTORIAL 
SUMMATIONS:  PROPOSING AN INTEGRATED 
RESPONSE 
Praatika Prasad* 
 
Racial bias has evolved from the explicit racism of the Jim Crow era to a 
more subtle and difficult-to-detect form:  implicit racial bias.  Implicit racial 
biases exist unconsciously and include negative racial stereotypes and 
associations.  Everyone, including actors in the criminal justice system who 
believe themselves to be fair, possess these biases.  Although inaccessible 
through introspection, implicit biases can easily be triggered through 
language.  When trials involve Black defendants, prosecutors’ summations 
increasingly include racial themes that could trigger jurors’ implicit biases, 
lead to the perpetuation of unfair stereotypes, and contribute to racial 
injustice and disparate outcomes. 
This Note examines and critiques the current approaches that courts and 
disciplinary authorities use to address implicit racial biases in prosecutorial 
summations.  Recognizing the inadequacy in these current methods, this Note 
proposes an integrated response, which involves lawyers, jurors, trial courts, 
and appellate courts.  The proposed approach seeks to increase recognition 
of implicit racial bias use, deter prosecutors from using language that 
triggers implicit racial biases, and ensure that Black defendants’ equal 
protection rights are upheld. 
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INTRODUCTION 
I was always told that sticks and stones may break my bones but words 
would never hurt me.  I found out that is a lie.  Words carry weight. 
—Gina, Johnny O’Landis Bennett’s sister1 
Johnny O’Landis Bennett, a Black2 man from South Carolina, was 
convicted of murder and sentenced to death in 2000.  Mr. Bennett remained 
 
 1. Justice 360, Bennett Film, YouTube, YOUTUBE (July 12, 2016), https://youtu.be/ 
sfd7D-6vh4Q?t=2m6s [https://perma.cc/5QM6-ZXS8]. 
 2. This Note capitalizes the term “Black.”  For an explanation of why, see Cheryl I. 
Harris, Whiteness as Property, 106 HARV. L. REV. 1707, 1710 n.3 (1993).  
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on death row until 2016.3  During trial, the prosecutor, Donald Myers, 
referred to Bennett as a “monster,” “caveman,” and a “beast of burden,” and 
he unnecessarily brought up Bennett’s sexual history with a “blond-headed 
lady.”4  Later, in his closing argument,5 Myers referred to Bennett as “King 
Kong.”6  The court overruled defense counsel’s multiple objections, and the 
all-white jury sentenced Bennett to death.7  Six years later, one of the jurors 
from Bennett’s case stated that he believed that Bennett had killed the alleged 
victim “[b]ecause [Bennett] was just a dumb n[——]r.”8  Even this clearly 
prejudicial statement did not bring Bennett relief.  The South Carolina state 
court concluded that the juror’s statement did not establish that he was 
racially biased at the time of the trial.9  In 2013, the South Carolina Supreme 
Court refused to reconsider the issue.10  Finally, in 2016, a federal trial judge 
in South Carolina overturned Bennett’s death sentence after recognizing that 
the trial “was so infected by racial animus by the prosecutor and a juror . . . 
that Bennett was deprived of his constitutional right to due process.”11 
As Martin Luther King Jr. reminded the American people in 1965, “the arc 
of the moral universe is long, but it bends toward justice.”12  The arc has 
since moved, but it has not travelled in a straight line.  Racism has evolved 
from the blatant “Whites Only” signs of the Jim Crow era to more diffuse 
and less obvious forms of racial biases.13  Although today’s reigning ideology 
of colorblindness insists that racism has significantly diminished, it has not.  
Black people make up only about 13 percent of the nation’s population, but 
they constitute 40 percent of those incarcerated and 42 percent of the 
population on death row.14  Scholars have recently recognized a largely 
unconscious contributing factor to this systemic disparity.  They have found 
 
 3. Federal Court Reverses Death Sentence Because of South Carolina Prosecutor’s 
Racially Biased Arguments, EQUAL JUST. INITIATIVE (Apr. 26, 2016), https://eji.org/news/ 
south-carolina-death-sentence-reversed-due-to-racially-biased-prosecutor-comments 
[https://perma.cc/4242-EBTT]. 
 4. Andrew Cohen, A Judge Overturned a Death Sentence Because the Prosecutor 
Compared a Black Defendant to King Kong, MARSHALL PROJECT (Mar. 28, 2016, 7:15 AM), 
https://www.themarshallproject.org/2016/03/28/a-judge-overturned-a-death-sentence-
because-the-prosecutor-compared-a-black-defendant-to-king-kong [https://perma.cc/95ZM-
7TG8]. 
 5. “Closing argument” and “summation” are used interchangeably throughout this Note.  
 6. See Cohen, supra note 4. 
 7. Id. 
 8. Id. 
 9. See generally State v. Bennett, 632 S.E.2d 281 (S.C. 2006). 
 10. Cohen, supra note 4. 
 11. Id.; see also Bennett v. Stirling, 842 F.3d 319, 327–28 (4th Cir. 2016). 
 12. Elise C. Boddie, The Arc of the Moral Universe, AM. CONST. SOC’Y FOR L. & POL’Y:  
ACSBLOG (Jan. 19, 2015), https://www.acslaw.org/acsblog/the-arc-of-the-moral-
universe#_ftnref5 [https://perma.cc/MSC6-FB99].  
 13. See infra Part I.A.  See generally Christopher Cerullo, Note, Everyone’s a Little Bit 
Racist?:  Reconciling Implicit Bias and Title VII, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 127 (2013).  
 14. Presumption of Guilt, EQUAL JUST. INITIATIVE, https://eji.org/racial-justice/ 
presumption-guilt [https://perma.cc/9EG9-FANU] (last visited Apr. 13, 2018). 
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that everyone harbors unconscious stereotypes and attitudes about race,15 
which shape the way that they understand the world and reflexively respond 
to racial stimuli.16  This is known as implicit racial bias.17 
The manifestation of implicit racial biases is difficult to detect and, even 
when detected, is capable of racially neutral interpretations.  Myers’s 
statements to the jury did not ask the jurors to draw on their explicit biases.18  
Instead, his statements drew on common themes that could evoke negative 
racial associations in the listener.19  Still, there was no way to conclusively 
prove that the juror’s stated reason for imposing the death penalty on Bennett 
was triggered by one of Myers’s many “subtle” racial references.  So, courts 
reviewing Bennett’s case between 2000 and 2016 viewed each racial 
reference as isolated and characterized Myers’s “King Kong” comment as a 
harmless reference to Bennett’s size.  Only after sixteen years did a court 
recognize that the King Kong reference “stoked race-based fears by conjuring 
the image of a gargantuan, black ape who goes on a killing spree.”20 
When prosecutors’ summations, such as Myers’s, involve subtle 
references to race or racial stereotypes as a result of their own implicit biases, 
in an attempt to appeal to jurors’ implicit biases, or both, the potential of 
prejudice influencing a decision is often not detected or is dismissed.21  This 
is not only a problem of due process but also one of equal protection as 
implicit racial biases can cause otherwise fair-minded actors in the criminal 
justice system to unknowingly perpetuate a racially inequitable society.22  
Unnoticed racially tinted arguments made during trial, whether implicit or 
explicit, reinforce racial biases.  These reinforced biases create and legitimize 
new generations of racially biased adjudication, legislation, policing, and 
prosecution.23  These biases also cause Black people to endure humiliations 
and disadvantages in all facets of their lives:  suspicious people on the street 
and potential employers, fearful cab drivers, and hovering storeowners.24 
While U.S. society has been trying to rid itself of the vestiges of slavery 
and racial language, this Note argues that the legal system is not effectively 
playing its part.  This Note posits that courts and disciplinary authorities 
allow for the perpetuation and reinforcement of racial biases because they do 
 
 15. See Chris Cialeo, Note, [In]equality Under the Law:  Remedying Unequal 
Antidiscrimination Ethics Rules for Federal Prosecutors, 28 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 435, 437 
(2015).  
 16. See Jonathan A. Rapping, Implicitly Unjust:  How Defenders Can Affect Systemic 
Racist Assumptions, 16 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 999, 1009 (2013).  
 17. Id. at 1009–10. There are many ways in which implicit racial biases enter the criminal 
justice system and contribute to disparate racial results, but this Note focuses specifically on 
the impact of implicit racial biases used in prosecutorial summations.  
 18. Explicit biases are “preference[s] deliberately generated and consciously experienced 
as one’s own.”  Chad Schmucker & Joseph Sawyer, Decision Making, Implicit Bias, and 
Judges, in ENHANCING JUSTICE REDUCING BIAS 1, 14 (Sarah E. Redfield ed., 2017).   
 19. See infra Part II. 
 20. Bennett v. Stirling, 842 F.3d 319, 325 (4th Cir. 2016).  
 21. See infra Part III.  
 22. See Rapping, supra note 16, at 1002. 
 23. Justin Murray, Reimagining Criminal Prosecution:  Toward a Color-Conscious 
Professional Ethic for Prosecutors, 49 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1541, 1567 (2012).  
 24. Id. 
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not adequately recognize or deter the use of implicit racial biases in 
prosecutors’ summations.  While Bennett’s death sentence was overturned, 
if the case was not a capital case, had fewer racial references, or lacked a 
clear due process violation, the 2016 judgment may have also ignored the 
implicitly racial component of Myers’s arguments. 
History shows that the arc of the moral universe does not bend towards 
justice on its own.25  U.S. society and the criminal justice system are striving 
toward racial neutrality and implicit racial biases impede this goal.  Thus, 
even if courts do not want to use resources to reverse convictions, implicit 
racial biases need to be adequately addressed to bend the arc closer to justice.  
This Note proposes an integrated response, involving multiple actors in the 
criminal justice system, to fully address the use of implicit racial biases in 
prosecutorial summations. 
Part I describes the evolution of the United States’ racial history and shows 
how historical racial stereotypes are now manifested through implicit racial 
biases.  It also explains the role of implicit bias in the criminal justice system 
by describing how the explicit and implicit biases of prosecutors impact 
jurors.  Through the examination of illustrative cases, Part II explores 
common ways in which implicit racial biases are injected into prosecutorial 
summations.  Part III analyzes the shortcomings in the current approaches 
taken by trial courts, appellate courts, and disciplinary authorities to address 
the use of implicit racial biases in prosecutorial summations.  Finally, Part IV 
recommends an integrated response to the problem of prosecutorial 
summations that trigger jurors’ implicit racial biases.  The proposed response 
includes (1) training judges and lawyers to recognize implicit racial themes, 
(2) judges uniformly giving pretrial implicit-bias instructions to educate the 
jury, and (3) judges immediately addressing arguments that may activate 
implicit racial biases by uniformly issuing comprehensive curative 
instructions and better rebuking prosecutors and trial judges to disincentivize 
veiled appeals to racial prejudice. 
Through such examination, this Note highlights the major impact that 
implicit racial biases can have on trial outcomes and on the perpetuation of 
societal racial injustice.  This Note seeks to provide practical guidance to 
courts and lawyers to identify implicitly racial themes in summations and 
deter their use, thus reducing the unfair impact on Black people both in the 
criminal justice system and in everyday life. 
I.  RACIAL BIAS IN THE LAW 
The U.S. criminal justice system is premised on fairness,26 and most 
participants in the criminal justice system believe that they can make fair and 
unbiased decisions, but data continue to show results markedly differentiated 
 
 25. See Schmucker & Sawyer, supra note 18, at 82. 
 26. See U.S. CONST. amend. VI (guaranteeing all criminal defendants the right to an 
impartial jury).  
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by race.27  This Part describes some of the reasons for this disparity.  Part I.A 
contextualizes the issue this Note seeks to address by discussing the enduring 
effects of historical racism on U.S. society.  Part I.B then provides an 
overview of implicit bias, with Part I.B.1 explaining how implicit biases 
function, Part I.B.2 discussing how implicit racial biases can impact jurors, 
and Part I.B.3 discussing how prosecutors’ implicit biases may manifest or 
activate jurors’ implicit racial biases.  Part I.C then describes the especially 
powerful impact that racially biased arguments can have in summations. 
A.  The Arc of Racial [In]justice:  Enduring Effects 
After every significant social transformation in U.S. history, the arc of 
racial justice has shifted and changed the way race is perceived in U.S. 
society.  This shift occurs because of the social impact of racial ideology 
combined with the unique characteristics of the particular transformative 
moment in time.28  Today is no different.  The historical oppression of Black 
people has left a deep imprint on the American psyche that now manifests 
through implicit biases.29  Racial bias today involves widely shared 
stereotypes about Black people, which were initially “forged by the engineers 
of racial animosity in the days of slavery”30 and which still affect U.S. society 
in insidious and subterranean ways. 
When slavery first began in the American colonies, its proponents 
explained that God had created different “types of mankind” and that Black 
people were “cursed by God.”31  Black people were thus seen as deserving 
of enslavement, and white slave owners as advancing God’s plan.  With the 
growth of science, several pseudosciences purported to study the physical 
variations across races to give scientific credence to the conception of whites 
as a species distinct from, and superior to, Black people.32  Along with these 
explanations came a set of caricatures—refined and exaggerated stereotypes 
that reinforced the image of Black people as naturally inferior, ill-equipped 
for freedom, and “destined for subordination to their white guardians.”33 
Following the Civil War, white Americans were anxious about the 
potential for “black retaliation for two centuries of enslavement.”34  These 
anxieties could no longer be described in vividly racist terms, so these 
postbellum constraints, fears, and needs led to new, more frightening 
caricatures of Black people.35  The once loyal, docile caricatures were 
 
 27. Achieving an Impartial Jury (AIJ) Toolbox, A.B.A. 1, 
https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publications/criminaljustice/voirdire_toolches
t.authcheckdam.pdf [https://perma.cc/S73E-G8S2] (last visited Apr. 13, 2018). 
 28. Imani Perry, Post-Intent Racism:  A New Framework for an Old Problem, 19 NAT’L 
BLACK L.J. 113, 136–37 (2006).   
 29. See Murray, supra note 23, at 1557. 
 30. Id.  
 31. Jon Hanson & Kathleen Hanson, The Blame Frame:  Justifying (Racial) Injustice in 
America, 41 HARV. C.R.-C.L.L. REV. 413, 432 (2006). 
 32. Id. at 433–34. 
 33. Id. at 435. 
 34. Id. at 436. 
 35. Id. at 437. 
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transformed into ones of Black people as “raging, rapacious, and 
threatening.”36  These caricatures showed that white people were alarmed 
that Black people might “compete with them economically, politically, and 
sexually.”37  The caricatures were used to confirm the belief that Black 
people were immoral and “incapable of self-government, unworthy of the 
franchise, and impossible to educate beyond the rudiments.”38 
Since the end of slavery and the inception of the NAACP,39 efforts have 
been made across society to rid America of vestiges of slavery,40 but 
postbellum stereotypes remain and the arc has a long way to bend to reach 
justice.41  Today, most Americans believe that society is “postracial” and that 
they are “colorblind.”42  Most Americans also believe that “racism is 
immoral, and that valuing racial classification over individual character is 
wrong.”43  Although public ideology today teaches equality and nonracism, 
there are many conscious and unconscious ways by which cultural patterns 
of racism interfere with a truly race-neutral society.44  Contemporary reasons 
used to explain racial disparities are different from those of the Jim Crow 
era—“whites today rely more on cultural rather than biological tropes to 
explain blacks’ position in this country”—but the substantive content of the 
underlying stereotypes remains fundamentally the same.45  These underlying 
negative attitudes about Black people perpetuate a “thought system accenting 
white superiority and black inferiority.”46 
Colorblindness is a guise used to hide racial bias today.  It includes the 
belief that because of equal opportunity, unequal outcomes between races are 
not unjust and merely reflect a lack of effort or ability.47  Thus, it faults Black 
people for persistent societal racial inequalities, including disparities in the 
criminal justice system, education, employment, and housing.48  
Colorblindness also considers only direct references to color or explicitly 
 
 36. Id.  
 37. R.A. Lenhardt, Understanding the Mark:  Race, Stigma, and Equality in Context, 79 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 803, 859 (2004). 
 38. Id. 
 39. Oldest and Boldest, NAACP, http://www.naacp.org/oldest-and-boldest/ 
[https://perma.cc/UR28-6XDB] (last visited Apr. 13, 2018). 
 40. Efforts continue to be made to educate Americans about U.S. racial history and the 
resulting disparities. See, e.g., MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW:  MASS 
INCARCERATION IN THE AGE OF COLORBLINDNESS (2012); MARSHALL (Open Road Films 2017). 
 41. See John C. Duncan, Jr., The American ‘Legal’ Dilemma:  Colorblind I/Colorblind 
II—The Rules Have Changed Again:  A Semantic Apothegmatic Permutation, 7 VA. J. SOC. 
POL’Y & L. 315, 376 (2000). 
 42. See Murray, supra note 23, at 1544.  
 43. Perry, supra note 28, at 116.  
 44. Duncan, supra note 41, at 377.  
 45. Murray, supra note 23, at 1551 (quoting EDUARDO BONILLA-SILVA, RACISM WITHOUT 
RACISTS:  COLOR-BLIND RACISM AND THE PERSISTENCE OF RACIAL INEQUALITY IN THE UNITED 
STATES 7 (2d ed. 2006)). 
 46. Sami C. Nighaoui, The Color of Post-Ethnicity:  The Civic Ideology and the 
Persistence of Anti-Black Racism, 20 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 349, 355 (2017) (quoting JOE 
R. FEAGIN, RACIST AMERICA:  ROOTS, CURRENT REALITIES, AND FUTURE REPARATIONS 105–
06 (2000)). 
 47. Murray, supra note 23, at 1543. 
 48. Id. at 1552. 
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derogatory racial epithets to be morally, legally, and politically wrong.49  
This discounts the reality that modern analogues of Black slavery tropes, 
“dog whistle[s],” and other racially coded language are now used to 
distinguish between races.50  Even political leaders mobilize white 
opposition to civil rights through coded vocabulary capable of marshalling 
racial fears without openly violating egalitarian norms.51  Racial coding and 
linguistic proxies for race, like “inner-city,”52 “welfare queens,”53 and 
“thugs,”54 extend the racial narrative by alluding to race without specifically 
referencing it.  Additionally, when people attempt to discuss the enduring 
relevance of race in modern-day social and political institutions, they are 
often silenced with accusations of “playing the race card.”55  To preserve the 
myth of equal opportunity and a postracial society, colorblindness propagates 
an image of Black people as “lazy, irresponsible, aggressive, and criminal.”56 
Today’s institutions continue to bend the arc away from justice by 
“enhanc[ing] slavery’s oppressive shadow” and perpetuating a two-tiered 
system of justice, even as actors and their institutions seek to end slavery’s 
legacy.57  Research on implicit bias finds that today’s racial biases and 
discrimination largely occur because of unconscious stereotypes about Black 
people.58  These stereotypes have endured the end of slavery, contributed to 
 
 49. Ian F. Haney Lopez, Post-Racial Racism:  Racial Stratification and Mass 
Incarceration in the Age of Obama, 98 CALIF. L. REV. 1023, 1063 (2010).   
 50. See William Y. Chin, The Age of Covert Racism in the Era of the Roberts Court 
During the Waning of Affirmative Action, 16 RUTGERS RACE & L. REV. 1, 9–10 (2015) 
(describing President Nixon’s use of coded appeals “as the centerpiece of his Southern 
Strategy”); see also Liam Stack, Alt-Right, Alt-Left, Antifa:  A Glossary of Extremist 
Language, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 15, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/08/15/us/politics/alt-
left-alt-right-glossary.html [https://perma.cc/4C4Z-XGMG].  
 51. See Lopez, supra note 49, at 1032.  President George H.W. Bush’s 1988 presidential 
campaign used the Black brute caricature to inflame white fear of Black criminality.  The 
campaign included an advertisement featuring Willie Horton, a Black man who was 
imprisoned for murdering a young boy. See Lenhardt, supra note 37, at 860. 
 52. Neil Irwin, Trump Says More Jobs Will Help Race Relations.  If Only It Were So 
Simple., N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 18, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/08/18/upshot/trump-
says-more-jobs-will-help-race-relations-if-only-it-were-so-simple.html [https://perma.cc/ 
Z24M-9PND].  
 53. Ronald Reagan’s campaign rhetoric tapped into an emotional reaction to the civil 
rights movement’s remedial measures among recession-wounded whites. See Perry, supra 
note 28, at 129.  
 54. Lisa Desjardins, Every Moment in Trump’s Charged Relationship with Race, PBS 
(Aug. 22, 2017), https://www.pbs.org/newshour/politics/every-moment-donald-trumps-long-
complicated-history-race [https://perma.cc/ZE7P-LWVE]. 
 55. Murray, supra note 23, at 1550 (quoting Lopez, supra note 49, at 1072). 
 56. Id. at 1551. 
 57. See Nick J. Sciullo, Richard Sherman, Rhetoric, and Racial Animus in the Rebirth of 
the Bogeyman Myth, 37 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 201, 222 (2015); see also Charles 
Ogletree et al., Criminal Law:  Coloring Punishment:  Implicit Social Cognition and Criminal 
Justice, in IMPLICIT RACIAL BIAS ACROSS THE LAW 45, 59–60 (Justin D. Levinson & Robert J. 
Smith eds., 2012). 
 58. See Darren Lenard Hutchinson, “Continually Reminded of Their Inferior Position”:  
Social Dominance, Implicit Bias, Criminality, and Race, 46 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 23, 35 
(2014). 
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the unfair administration of criminal justice, and continue to negatively affect 
all aspects of Black people’s lives.59 
B.  Implicit Racial Bias:  An Overview 
Although overt racism has declined,60 racial bias has the ability to 
transform itself.  Modern manifestations of racial disparities through implicit 
biases have roots in the pervasive, negative historical stereotypes about Black 
people.61 
Implicit biases are activated involuntarily and without one’s awareness or 
control.62  As such, these biases are not consciously accessible even through 
introspection.63  Implicit biases are formed by implicit attitudes (unconscious 
preferences)64 and implicit stereotypes (nonconscious mental associations 
between a group and a trait).65  Social cognition theorists believe that implicit 
attitudes represent “traces of past experiences” that inform and shape 
preferences prospectively,66 and they believe that implicit stereotypes 
determine how people treat members of other social groups.67 
The most prevalent conception of social behavior is that humans are guided 
solely by explicit beliefs and conscious decisions to act.68  In contrast, 
implicit associations arise outside of conscious awareness and do not 
necessarily align with individuals’ openly held beliefs.69  When implicit and 
explicit attitudes toward the same object differ, the discrepancies are referred 
to as dissociations.70  People who believe that they have favorable attitudes 
toward different racial groups may be surprised to learn that their implicit 
associations tell a different story.71  These dissociations can be tested through 
the Implicit Association Test (IAT).72  The IAT is the best-known, most 
 
 59. See Personal Experiences with Discrimination, PEW RES. CTR. (June 27, 2016), 
http://www.pewsocialtrends.org/2016/06/27/5-personal-experiences-with-discrimination/ 
[https://perma.cc/CX7Z-ZNHV]. 
 60. See supra Part I.A. 
 61. Cynthia Lee, Making Race Salient:  Trayvon Martin and Implicit Bias in a Not Yet 
Post-Racial Society, 91 N.C. L. REV. 1555, 1580 (2013) (stating that racism is “perpetuated 
within our culture in subtle, yet highly effectual, ways”). 
 62. See KIRWAN INST. FOR THE STUDY OF RACE & ETHNICITY, STATE OF THE SCIENCE:  
IMPLICIT BIAS REVIEW 6 (2013). 
 63. See id.  
 64. See Hutchinson, supra note 58, at 35. 
 65. Anthony G. Greenwald & Linda Hamilton Krieger, Implicit Bias:  Scientific 
Foundations, 94 CALIF. L. REV. 945, 946, 949 (2006). 
 66. See Hutchinson, supra note 58, at 35. 
 67. Id. 
 68. See Greenwald & Krieger, supra note 65, at 946. 
 69. Id.  
 70. Id. at 949.  
 71. Robert J. Smith & Justin D. Levinson, The Impact of Implicit Racial Bias on the 
Exercise of Prosecutorial Discretion, 35 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 795, 803 (2012). 
 72. To take the IAT or for more information about the IAT, see Preliminary Information, 
PROJECT IMPLICIT, https://implicit.harvard.edu/implicit/takeatest.html [https://perma.cc/ 
9KEA-P7WW] (last visited Apr. 13, 2018).  For more information about the IAT, see Lee, 
supra note 61, at 1570; Justin D. Levinson, Huajian Cai & Danielle Young, Guilty by Implicit 
Racial Bias:  The Guilty/Not Guilty Implicit Association Test, 8 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 187, 191 
(2010).  
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thoroughly tested measure of implicit bias.73  It tests implicit responses by 
inferring associations in a manner that is not apparent to participants.74  IAT 
results are statistically significant and not due to random chance variations in 
measurements.75  Over a decade of research shows that implicit racial 
stereotypes can be activated easily and can lead to biased decision-making.76  
There is also evidence that implicit biases predict everyday behavior.77 
Because implicit biases can produce behavior that differs from a person’s 
endorsed beliefs, they are difficult to control or remedy.78  But there is 
significant evidence that implicit biases are malleable.79  Attempts at being 
colorblind can exacerbate the power of implicit racial biases because ignoring 
race can cause automatic engagement of stereotype-congruent responses.80  
Implicit biases can be controlled, however, if actors are aware of their biases, 
are motivated to change their responses, and possess cognitive resources 
necessary to develop and practice correction strategies.81 
In the criminal justice context, implicit biases can influence how actors in 
the criminal justice system behave when confronted with applying race to 
decision-making.82  Jurors,83 lawyers,84 and even judges85 are not immune to 
implicit biases.  Implicit negative racial biases coupled with implicit white 
favoritism perpetuates racial disparities.86  Understanding how implicit racial 
 
 73. See JERRY KANG, IMPLICIT BIAS:  A PRIMER FOR COURTS 3 (2009); Robert J. Smith, 
Justin D. Levinson & Zoe Robinson, Implicit White Favoritism in the Criminal Justice System, 
66 ALA. L. REV. 871, 880 (2015).  
 74. Greenwald & Krieger, supra note 65, at 952–53.  In the racial IAT, respondents pair 
“black” and “white” faces with “positive” and “negative” words.  The results show that, when 
measuring response times and error rates, most people are quick to pair “positive” words with 
“white” faces and “negative” words with “black” faces.  Over 90 percent of white people show 
implicit white over Black preferences on the IAT, which demonstrates that they implicitly 
associate Black people with dangerousness, criminality, and violence. See Christine Jolls & 
Cass R. Sunstein, The Law of Implicit Bias, 94 CALIF. L. REV. 969, 971 (2006); see also Smith, 
Levinson & Robinson, supra note 73, at 880. 
 75. See KANG, supra note 73, at 3.  A recent meta-analysis of 122 research reports 
involving a total of 14,900 subjects revealed that implicit bias IAT scores better predict 
behavior than explicit self-reports. Id. at 4. 
 76. See Smith & Levinson, supra note 71, at 805.  
 77. Id.   
 78. See Greenwald & Krieger, supra note 65, at 951. 
 79. See Anna Roberts, (Re)forming the Jury:  Detection and Disinfection of Implicit Juror 
Bias, 44 CONN. L. REV. 827, 834–35 (2012).  See generally Irene V. Blair, The Malleability of 
Automatic Stereotypes and Prejudice, 6 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. REV. 242 (2002). 
 80. Lee, supra note 61, at 1560. 
 81. See KANG, supra note 73, at 5; Nicole R. Negowetti, Navigating the Pitfalls of Implicit 
Bias:  A Cognitive Science Primer for Civil Litigators, 4 ST. MARY’S J. ON LEGAL 
MALPRACTICE & ETHICS 278, 290 (2014). 
 82. See Rapping, supra note 16, at 1010. 
 83. See infra Part I.B.1. 
 84. See generally Jerry Kang et al., Are Ideal Litigators White?  Measuring the Myth of 
Colorblindness, 7 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 886 (2010). 
 85. See generally Chris Guthrie, Jeffrey J. Rachlinski & Andrew J. Wistrich, Inside the 
Judicial Mind, 86 CORNELL L.F. 1 (2001); Jeffrey J. Rachlinski et al., Does Unconscious 
Racial Bias Affect Trial Judges?, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1195 (2009). 
 86. See Smith, Levinson & Robinson, supra note 73, at 874–75 (defining implicit 
favoritism as “the automatic association of positive stereotypes and attitudes with members of 
2018] RACIAL BIASES IN PROSECUTORS’ SUMMATIONS 3101 
bias works can help to illustrate how legal actors who believe in justice and 
may not be conscious of their racial preferences or animus can perpetuate a 
racially unjust system and society.87 
1.  Racial Bias and the Jury 
During trial, the jury is meant to establish facts based on evidence and 
apply the law as instructed.88  Since every defendant has the right to a fair 
trial, the jury is expected to be indifferent to the defendant’s immutable 
characteristics, regardless of the alleged crime committed or probability of 
guilt.89  Because selection of biased jurors violates this right, a fair cross 
section of the community must be represented on the jury,90 prosecutors must 
not use race-based peremptory strikes,91 and courts are constitutionally 
required to inquire into potential jurors’ racial biases.92 
While potential jurors are screened for explicit racial biases, they may still 
possess implicit racial biases.  As the IAT has repeatedly shown, race 
influences the behavior of individuals who endorse egalitarian beliefs and 
can even affect jurors who believe themselves to have no racial biases.93 
Cognitive theory has shown that latent biases do not have a force of their own 
and require a stimulus to elicit the stereotype from and produce a motivating 
response in the audience.94  Thus, jurors’ implicit biases must be triggered 
before they can adversely affect a defendant’s trial. 
Researchers have found that even the “simplest of racial cues” can 
automatically evoke racial stereotypes and affect the way jurors evaluate 
evidence.95  Therefore, “subtle manipulations” of a defendant’s background 
affect juror decision-making to a greater extent than explicit references to 
race.96  Once racial stereotypes have entered a trial, the defendant’s ability to 
be judged by an impartial jury is lost.  While jurors may be more “careful and 
thoughtful” about their opinions when a prosecutor explicitly references race, 
 
a favored group, leading to preferential treatment for persons of that group”).  This Note does 
not discuss implicit favoritism at length. 
 87. See Rapping, supra note 16, at 1000. 
 88. See Andrew Guthrie Ferguson, Jury Instructions as Constitutional Education, 84 U. 
COLO. L. REV 233, 268 (2013). 
 89. See Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 722 (1961). 
 90. See, e.g., Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357, 364–66 (1979) (holding that jury venires 
consisting of only 15 percent women violated representative requirements because women 
constitute 54 percent of the adults in the county). 
 91. See Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 96–98 (1986). 
 92. See, e.g., United States v. Love, 219 F.3d 721, 728–29 (8th Cir. 2000) (finding that 
courts are required to inquire into racial prejudice when the reasonable possibility of racial 
prejudice exists because an all-white jury’s opinion about Blacks is unknown).  But see, e.g., 
United States v. Ortiz, 315 F.3d 873, 890–91 (8th Cir. 2002) (finding that the trial court was 
not required to make further inquiries of venirepersons who found Blacks and Hispanics more 
violent because venirepersons said race would not affect their decision). 
 93. Lee, supra note 61, at 1560.  
 94. See Ryan Patrick Alford, Appellate Review of Racist Summations:  Redeeming the 
Promise of Searching Analysis, 11 MICH. J. RACE & L. 325, 347 (2006). 
 95. See Rapping, supra note 16, at 1014.  
 96. Jerry Kang et al., Implicit Bias in the Courtroom, 59 UCLA L. REV. 1124, 1144 
(2012). 
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they are not usually as careful with implicit racial references.97  A study 
measuring the effect of implicit bias on the presumption of innocence showed 
that jurors struggled to reconcile the presumption of innocence with negative 
stereotypes of Black people.98 
2.  Racial Bias and the Prosecutor 
Prosecutors are representatives of the people and, thus, have an additional 
set of ethical rules and guidelines to follow.99  Prosecutors play two distinct 
roles in the criminal justice system.100  They must act as agents of compliance 
with the law and as quasi-judicial officers seeking justice.101  Additionally, 
prosecutors are expected to be fair to the opposing party and not “allude to 
any matter that the lawyer does not reasonably believe is relevant or . . . 
supported by admissible evidence.”102  Because the jury places its confidence 
in prosecutors and considers them unprejudiced and impartial, prosecutors 
must operate with “one hand on the throttle and the other hand poised firmly 
on the brake.”103  Prosecutors are expected to prosecute with “earnestness 
and vigor,” and while they are permitted to “strike hard blows, [they are] not 
at liberty to strike foul ones.”104  Thus, prosecutors must refrain from using 
race to deny defendants their right to equal protection and a fair trial.105 
Although prosecutors largely report egalitarian racial attitudes,106 they 
often still inject racial references into jury deliberations.107  Prosecutors 
commit misconduct108 when they make improper racial references and must, 
therefore, understand the difference between permissible and impermissible 
references.  While prosecutors may discuss race in certain situations, such as 
 
 97. Id. at 1134. 
 98. See Levinson, Cai & Young, supra note 72, at 190. 
 99. See generally CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS FOR THE PROSECUTION FUNCTION (AM. 
BAR ASS’N 2015); MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 3.8 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2013). 
 100. Elizabeth L. Earle, Note, Banishing the Thirteenth Juror:  An Approach to the 
Identification of Prosecutorial Racism, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 1212, 1219 (1992). 
 101. See CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS FOR THE PROSECUTION FUNCTION § 3-1.2(b) (“The 
prosecutor is an administrator of justice, an advocate, and an officer of the court; the prosecutor 
must exercise sound discretion in the performance of his or her functions.”); id. § 3-1.2(c) 
(“The duty of the prosecutor is to seek justice, not merely to convict.”); MODEL RULES OF 
PROF’L CONDUCT r. 3.8 cmt. 1 (“A prosecutor has the responsibility of a minister of justice and 
not simply that of an advocate.”). 
 102. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 3.4(e). 
 103. Henry Blaine Vess, Walking a Tightrope:  A Survey of Limitations on the Prosecutor’s 
Closing Argument, 64 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 22, 22 (1973).  
 104. Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935). 
 105. See Vess, supra note 103, at 22.   
 106. See Smith & Levinson, supra note 71, at 803.  
 107. See BENNETT L. GERSHMAN, PROSECUTION STORIES 80 (2017) (stating that prosecutors 
often try to “inflame a jury’s fears and stereotypes with predictions of bloodshed, terror, and 
violence unless the jury convict[s] the accused black man”).  
 108. Sandra Uribe, A Primer on Alleging Prosecutorial Misconduct on Appeal, CENTRAL 
CAL. APPELLATE PROGRAM, https://www.capcentral.org/criminal/articles/docs/primer_da_ 
misconduct.pdf [https://perma.cc/SMC8-4V23] (last visited Apr. 13, 2018) (defining 
prosecutorial misconduct as “the use of deceptive or reprehensible methods to attempt to 
persuade either the court or the jury”).  
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whether it pertains to motive regarding, for example, hate crimes,109 they 
must not make racial arguments that could “appeal to the prejudices of the 
jury”110 or that “would divert the jury from its duty to decide the case on the 
evidence.”111 
Prosecutors possess implicit biases like everyone else, so they may 
sometimes make improper racial references unconsciously112 or may make 
“subtle” references to trigger jurors’ implicit racial biases.  Whether 
intentional or not, prosecutors strike foul blows when they make negative 
racial references as they wrongly conflate stereotypical constructions with 
Black defendants’ inherent character traits.113  These racial stereotypes are 
never relevant, may appeal to juror prejudice, and may prevent the jury from 
making a decision based on the evidence alone. 
3.  The Climax of the Case:  Racial Bias in Summations 
In closing arguments, prosecutors have a chance to sum up the trial 
evidence with a narrative to help the jury understand and interpret the 
evidence.114  While prosecutors may inject racial bias at any point during the 
trial, the closing argument is the most opportune moment to do so.115  Not 
many cases are won or lost through the closing argument alone, but it is a 
powerful tool for the prosecutor.116  The closing argument has been described 
as the “most important phase . . . of any jury trial”117 and “the high point in 
the art of advocacy.”118  A prosecutors’ persuasive power is highest during 
the summation because it is the last word spoken by the prosecutors to the 
jury, and social science shows that people tend to be most influenced by the 
most recent event in a sequence.119 
When prosecutors make mistakes, whether intentional or not, the system 
itself “becomes suspect.”120  Overt appeals to race, ethnicity, or religious 
discrimination in closing arguments have been found to be “the most 
troubling types of inflammatory arguments.”121  Since overt racial appeals 
 
 109. See Andrea D. Lyon, Setting the Record Straight:  A Proposal for Handling 
Prosecutorial Appeals to Racial, Ethnic or Gender Prejudice During Trial, 6 MICH. J. RACE 
& L. 319, 335 (2001). 
 110. CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS FOR THE PROSECUTION FUNCTION § 3-5.8(c) (AM. BAR 
ASS’N 2015). 
 111. Id. § 3-5.8(d). 
 112. No published study discusses the participation of prosecutors in IAT research, but 
there is little reason to believe that prosecutors do not possess implicit biases. See Hutchinson, 
supra note 58, at 62–63; Rapping, supra note 16, at 1011. 
 113. Anthony V. Alfieri, Objecting to Race, 27 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1129, 1143–44 
(2014). 
 114. See Mary Nicol Bowman, Mitigating Foul Blows, 49 GA. L. REV. 309, 320 (2015). 
 115. See Alford, supra note 94, at 329. 
 116. See Vess, supra note 103, at 23. 
 117. See Alford, supra note 94, at 329. 
 118. Id. 
 119. See Bowman, supra note 114, at 344 (describing empirical research on the “recency 
effect”). 
 120. H. Mitchell Caldwell, The Prosecutor Prince:  Misconduct, Accountability, and a 
Modest Proposal, 63 CATH. U. L. REV. 51, 59 (2013). 
 121. Bowman, supra note 114, at 325. 
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have largely been replaced with subtle forms of bias,122 summations that use 
implicitly racial biases can also result in markedly unfair outcomes for Black 
defendants and affect larger societal racial attitudes.  Still, the power of 
prosecutorial summations to elicit racial responses from the jury has largely 
gone unnoticed.123  One reason for this is that identifying subtle racial themes 
in summations and differentiating between permissible and impermissible 
arguments when coded language is used is incredibly challenging for 
courts.124 
II.  OVERLOOKED RACIAL THEMES IN PROSECUTORIAL SUMMATIONS 
Coded language that seems racially neutral but has roots in historical racial 
oppression is often used in summations.125  Since prosecutors may use 
language that varies in source, subtlety, and in which aspect of racial animus 
or stereotype it evokes,126 there are a near-infinite number of ways by which 
prosecutors can surreptitiously inject race into their closing arguments, 
appeal to juror prejudices, and contribute to racially disparate outcomes.127 
Through an examination of case law, this Part illustrates some racial 
themes that are commonly used in prosecutorial summations.  Most of these 
themes draw on postbellum stereotypes to dehumanize Black defendants.  If 
unaddressed, these stereotypes reinforce jurors’ biases and perpetuate racial 
injustice.128  The cases described in this Part are not exhaustive because 
criminal trials with racially coded language are difficult to track.  This is 
because reported cases of improper use of racial imagery are merely the 
visible tip of the iceberg while subtle uses of racial imagery are the 
“unexplored Antarctica.”129  Many cases with improper summations do not 
result in appeals and, even if they do, the racial terms may not be in the 
published opinions because courts may not deem them improper or 
important.130 
Part II.A examines prosecutors’ use of the Black dishonesty stereotype.  
Next, Part II.B reviews comparisons made between animals, brutes, and 
Black defendants.  Part II.C discusses language used to distance Black people 
from jurors.  Part II.D then shows how Black defendants’ sexual behavior is 
used to incite animosity.  Finally, Part II.E discusses other common themes, 
such as highlighting neighborhood differences, derogatory pronunciation of 
certain words, and various inappropriate comparisons.  This review of the 
 
 122. See supra Part I.A.  
 123. See Alford, supra note 94, at 330; see also infra Part II. 
 124. See Lyon, supra note 109, at 335. 
 125. See, e.g., Charles F. Coleman, Jr., “Thug” Is the New N-Word, EBONY (May 27, 2015), 
http://www.ebony.com/news-views/thug-is-the-new-n-word [https://perma.cc/U85V-APRD]. 
 126. There are hundreds of racial stereotypes and slurs for each disfavored racial group. 
See RACIAL SLUR DATABASE, http://www.rsdb.org/full [https://perma.cc/72BU-52VU] (last 
visited Apr. 13, 2018).  
 127. See Alford, supra note 94, at 353. 
 128. See supra notes 23–24 and accompanying text.  
 129. See Sheri Lynn Johnson, Racial Imagery in Criminal Cases, 67 TUL. L. REV. 1739, 
1762 (1993). 
 130. See infra Part III.B.2. 
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limited available case law is indicative of how commonly implicit racial 
biases are used in summations, thus hindering the arc on its journey towards 
justice. 
A.  Black Dishonesty 
Black dishonesty is a racial stereotype that commonly enters prosecutorial 
summations.  A variation of the dishonesty image is that Black people are 
more likely to lie when they testify for each other and more likely to tell the 
truth when they testify against each other.131 
In closing arguments, prosecutors have suggested that witnesses are “more 
reliable” because both the witness and the defendant were Black,132 that the 
Black defendant must be lying because the defendant’s testimony did not 
match the white witness’s testimony,133 that a Black person was “shucking 
and jiving” on stand,134 that a Black “anti-snitch code” exists,135 and that the 
“evil” Black defendant is always “willing to lie.”136  In a 2015 case, the 
prosecutor referenced a statement made by a slave in Gone with the Wind to 
show that in the present case, the Black witnesses were lying to protect the 
Black defendant.137 
B.  Animal Imagery and the Black Brute 
Prosecutors’ use of animal imagery and the “black brute” caricature in their 
closing arguments dehumanizes Black defendants.138  Dehumanization 
reduces white persons’ empathy for Black people, which could explain why 
violent crimes against white victims typically trigger harsher punishments 
than crimes against people of color, particularly when the offender is Black 
and the victim is white.139 
Animal imagery can both depend on and perpetuate the negative effects of 
implicit racial biases.140  By using similes that do not explicitly allude to race 
 
 131. See Johnson, supra note 129, at 1756. 
 132. McFarland v. Smith, 611 F.2d 414, 416 (2d Cir. 1979); People v. Alexander, 727 
N.E.2d 109, 110 (N.Y. 1999). 
 133. See, e.g., Withers v. United States, 602 F.2d 124, 125 (6th Cir. 1979) (claiming that 
defendant was lying because no white witness contradicted the prosecution’s position); State 
v. Mitchell, No. A08-0464, 2009 WL 1047183, at *2 (Minn. Ct. App. Apr. 21, 2009) (asking 
the jury whether they were going to believe the “police officer witnesses” or “the greedy 
defendant”). 
 134. See United States v. Pendergraft, 297 F.3d 1198, 1204 (11th Cir. 2002).  The court 
recognized the phrase as having racial origins; it was originally slang adopted by Black people 
to “describe a situation where blacks lie to whites to stay out of trouble.” Id. at 1211; see also 
Smith v. Farley, 59 F.3d 659, 663 (7th Cir. 1995) (referring to a reluctant Black witness as 
lying on the stand). 
 135. State v. Monday, 257 P.3d 551, 555–57 (Wash. 2011); State v. Berube, 286 P.3d 402, 
403–04 (Wash. Ct. App. 2012). 
 136. Toler v. State, 95 So. 3d 913, 916 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2012). 
 137. Long v. Butler, 809 F.3d 299, 305–06 (7th Cir. 2015) (“And sorry, Miss Scarlet, but 
we don’t know nothing about birthing no babies . . . .  [T]here are 40 to 60 people around this 
dead young man, . . . nobody knows nothing.”). 
 138. See Smith & Levinson, supra note 71, at 820.  
 139. See Hutchinson, supra note 58, at 86. 
 140. See Johnson, supra note 129, at 1746. 
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but conjure up stereotypes of Black people as having animalistic tendencies 
or behaving like an animal would, prosecutors can conjure up violent images 
about the defendant in jurors’ minds.141 
Prosecutors have repeatedly compared Black defendants to apes in their 
summations.142  In one instance, a prosecutor compared a Black defendant to 
“Curious George,” a monkey in a series of children’s books.143  In other 
instances, prosecutors have referenced movies such as Gorillas in the Mist144 
and King Kong145 while discussing Black defendants.  Prosecutors have also 
compared Black defendants to other animals and made references to them 
belonging in, and having to return to, the jungle.146 
The brute caricature is an extension of animal imagery.  The brute image 
portrays Black men as “innately savage, animalistic, destructive, and 
criminal—deserving punishment, maybe death.”147  The image of Black men 
as “brutes” was proliferated through cartoons and the media extensively from 
Reconstruction through the twentieth century.148  The movie The Birth of a 
Nation149 was shown for fifteen years in the southern states and was 
instrumental in shaping the stereotype of the “savage black brute.”150  Like 
other caricatures of the time, the original purpose of the brute image was to 
justify repressive measures against Black people.151 
In the early part of the twentieth century, Black defendants were openly 
referred to as “black brutes” in court.152  Although no longer primarily used 
 
 141. Darden v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 168, 192 (1986) (stating that the prosecutor described 
the defendant as an “animal” that “shouldn’t be [let] out of his cell unless he has a leash on 
him”). 
 142. See, e.g., Allen v. State, 871 P.2d 79, 97 (Okla. Crim. App. 1994) (comparing the 
defendant to an ape by pointing to a postcard with a gorilla on it). 
 143. See State v. McCail, 565 S.E.2d 96, 103 (N.C. Ct. App. 2002). 
 144. State v. Blanks, 479 N.W.2d 601, 602 (Iowa Ct. App. 1991) (describing the defendant 
in relation to the 1988 movie Gorillas in the Mist, which deals with field research on gorilla 
behavior). 
 145. Bennett v. Stirling, 842 F.3d 319, 321 (4th Cir. 2016) (referencing the 1933 film King 
Kong). 
 146. See, e.g., United States v. Ebron, 683 F.3d 105, 142 (5th Cir. 2012) (referring to the 
defendant as “lions and tigers in the jungle”); People v. Nightengale, 523 N.E.2d 136, 139 (Ill. 
App. Ct. 1988) (characterizing the defendant as a “debased animal”); State v. Wilson, 404 So. 
2d 968, 969 (La. 1981) (“[W]hy is it a black Sunday?  Because these two animals decided to 
shoot white honkies.”); People v. Walker, 411 N.Y.S.2d 377, 380 (App. Div. 1978) (referring 
to people in the defendant’s community as a bunch of animals); State v. Richardson, 467 
S.E.2d 685, 697 (N.C. 1996) (characterizing the defendant as an “animal” in describing the 
violent nature of the attack). 
 147. See Alford, supra note 94, at 345. 
 148. Id.  For more information about Black caricatures and tropes, see Part I.A. 
 149. THE BIRTH OF A NATION (David W. Griffith Corp. 1915). 
 150. Leonard M. Baynes, Paradoxes of Racial Stereotypes, Diversity and Past 
Discrimination in Establishing Affirmative Action in FCC Broadcast Licensing, 52 ADMIN. L. 
REV. 979, 983 (2000) (describing the portrayal of two white men wearing blackface and 
scaring a young white woman until she leapt to her death). 
 151. See supra notes 33–38 and accompanying text.  
 152. See, e.g., State v. Washington, 50 So. 660, 661 (La. 1909) (stating that the prosecutor 
referred to the defendant as a “black brute in human form”); Prokop v. Gulf, Colo. & Santa Fe 
Ry., 79 S.W. 101, 102 (Tex. Civ. App. 1904) (describing prosecutor as stating that the 
“darkness would . . . better conceal” the “black brute[’s]” identity). 
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in the same form, this stereotype continues to be associated with fear and 
loathing, likely motivating a similar response when activated by external 
stimuli, such as a prosecutor’s summation.153  O.J. Simpson has become an 
avatar of the brute caricature among white people, and prosecutors cast 
Simpson in this role.154  Using Simpson’s name in prosecutors’ summations 
may cause jurors to associate Black defendants with violent abuse and evoke 
negative feelings in jurors who believe that Simpson was not punished for 
his alleged crimes.155 
C.  “Us-Them” Associations 
Implicit racial associations affect how members of racial groups respond 
to outsiders.  Since each group carries its peculiar set of biases, implicit bias 
scholars argue that “in-group” members treat “out-group” members worse 
than individuals in their own racial group.156  By using euphemisms such as 
“us” and “them,” prosecutors can emphasize racial separation while believing 
that they are not making racial statements.157  These euphemisms allow white 
jurors to view “Black defendants” as a separate entity who come from a 
distinct community.  Jurors who hear “us-them” messages may be less likely 
to think that Black defendants deserve sympathy.  They are also less likely to 
properly weigh the evidence of Black defendants’ guilt.158  In its most 
outrageous form, this theme implies that the jury must rule against Black 
defendants to “restrain future interracial crimes.”159 
Prosecutors have evoked this theme in their summations by differentiating 
between the jurors’ and defendants’ “worlds”160 and making statements like 
 
 153. See Alford, supra note 94, at 345. 
 154. See Leonard M. Baynes, A Time to Kill, the O.J. Simpson Trials, and Storytelling to 
Juries, 17 LOY. L.A. ENT. L.J. 549, 559 (1997) (describing the O.J. Simpson’s prosecutor as 
using Simpson’s past violent behavior to cause white jurors to “blacken” Simpson with the 
prevailing stereotype of a violent Black brute).  
 155. See, e.g., State v. Taylor, 650 N.W.2d 190, 207 (Minn. 2002); see also Brief for the 
Constitution Project as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioner, Snyder v. Louisiana, 552 U.S. 
472 (2008) (No. 06-10119), 2007 U.S. S. Ct. Brief LEXIS 723, at *10; Hannah Riley, The 
Supreme Court Stays Keith Tharpe’s Execution at the Last Minute, HUFFPOST (Sept. 27, 2017, 
7:52 AM), https://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/the-supreme-court-stays-keith-tharpes-
execution-at_us_59ca540ae4b0f2df5e83b166 [https://perma.cc/2TU6-5YQ6] (quoting a juror 
as saying, “I have wondered if black people even have souls.  [L]ook at O.J. Simpson.  That 
white woman wouldn’t have been killed if she hadn’t have married that black man.”). 
 156. See Hutchinson, supra note 58, at 28.  Implicit in-group favoritism research shows 
that people automatically associate positive characteristics with the in-group, or “us,” and 
negative characteristics with the out-group, or “them.”  See Smith, Levinson & Robinson, 
supra note 73, at 895. 
 157. See Johnson, supra note 129, at 1765. 
 158. See Alford, supra note 94, at 353. 
 159. See Johnson, supra note 129, at 1756. 
 160. See, e.g., United States v. Richardson, 161 F.3d 728, 736 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (implying 
that defense counsel is removed from the reality of the defendant being forced to grow up 
quickly by differentiating between defense counsel’s and defendant’s worlds); State v. 
Shabazz, 48 P.3d 605, 625 (Haw. Ct. App. 2002) (juxtaposing a “young local woman” with 
“African-American male[]” defendants); State v. Martin, 773 N.W.2d 89, 107 (Minn. 2009) 
(telling jurors, “welcome to the real world”); State v. Paul, 716 N.W.2d 329, 334 (Minn. 2006) 
(referencing the “world” several witnesses lived in and using “these people” to describe them); 
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Black people “execute street justice.”161  Prosecutors have also used language 
like “them,”162 “these people,”163 and “not like us”164 to highlight the 
difference between the jurors and Black defendants. 
D.  Describing Sexual Behavior 
In 1903, a respected medical journal published a “lurid and detailed 
account” of Black men’s supposed “sexual madness.”165  This stereotype was 
used to justify segregation and subjugation as Black men were seen as a threat 
to white women.166  Today, prosecutors continue to play on Black men’s 
supposed sexual appetite and sexual threat.167 
To do this, prosecutors describe negative acts with the racial conclusion 
left implicit.  In cases involving sexual-threat imagery, prosecutors do not 
argue that miscegeny is wrong.  Instead, prosecutors indirectly highlight the 
Black defendant’s race by pointing out that his sexual, domestic, or romantic 
partners are white, or that the alleged victim is white.168  Often, prosecutors 
also imply that sexual interactions with Black men are humiliating and, thus, 
never consensual.169  These arguments are not made if the defendant is white 
because of the purported normality of whiteness.170 
E.  Highlighting Neighborhood Differences, 
Derogatory Pronunciation, and Improper Comparisons 
In some summations, prosecutors discuss the perceived negative qualities 
and dangerousness of Black neighborhoods or communities.171  After setting 
up a dichotomy between Black and white communities, prosecutors 
 
Amici Curiae Brief of the Washington Defender Association at 3–4, State v. Lewis, No. 
89920-7 (Wash. Aug. 19, 2014), 2014 WA S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 685, at *4–6 (referring to the 
“underbelly of society”). 
 161. State v. Berube, 286 P.3d 402, 407 (Wash. Ct. App. 2012). 
 162. United States v. Doe, 903 F.2d 16, 23 n.48 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (“Jamaicans are coming 
in, they’re taking over the retail sale of crack . . . .”). 
 163. State v. Paul, 716 N.W. 2d 329, 341 (Minn. 2006) (implying that jurors are collectively 
distinguishable from defendants and witnesses); State v. Mitchell, No. A08-0464, 2009 WL 
1047183, at *2 (Minn. Ct. App. Apr. 21, 2009) (asking “what kind of people are these” and 
adding that “these other people from the street are upset”).  
 164. State v. Mitchell, 620 S.W.2d 347, 349 (Mo. 1981). 
 165. See Hanson & Hanson, supra note 31, at 437.  
 166. See supra notes 36–38 and accompanying text.  
 167. See Johnson, supra note 129, at 1754. 
 168. See, e.g., State v. Shabazz, 48 P.3d 605, 624–25 (Haw. Ct. App. 2002) (describing the 
incident as a “gang rape” and highlighting that the defendants were Black); State v. Blanks, 
479 N.W.2d 601, 605 (Iowa Ct. App. 1991) (comparing a movie plot in which a young white 
woman was violently murdered by Black hunters to the case of a single white woman allegedly 
being beaten by Black defendant); State v. Richmond, 904 P.2d 974, 983 (Kan. 1995) 
(describing “[b]oth of the victims white females, forties”). 
 169. See, e.g., People v. Cudjo, 863 P.2d 635, 661 (Cal. 1993) (pointing out that a white 
woman would not want to have intercourse with a Black man); Reynolds v. State, 580 So. 2d 
254, 256 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991) (stating that it is humiliating to admit to having been raped 
by a Black man). 
 170. See Alford, supra note 94, at 355. 
 171. Id. at 354. 
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emphasize the defendant’s connection to a Black community and allude to 
the association between the defendant and criminality.172 
To imply that the Black defendant committed the crime because of his race, 
prosecutors have pronounced certain words in a derogatory manner,173 
recited lines from an anthem of the Confederacy,174 and improperly 
compared defendants to the “one-eyed jack”175 and “super-fly.”176  
Prosecutors have also alluded to the racial stereotype of Black people having 
to grow up faster, which makes them more prone to crime.177 
III.  CURRENT METHODS OF ADDRESSING RACIAL BIAS 
IN SUMMATIONS ARE INADEQUATE 
The legal system has not kept up with the increasing research about 
implicit racial bias.  As such, it does not fully recognize that prosecutors’ use 
of implicit racial references appeal to passion and prejudice instead of law 
and fact, which compromises the fundamental guarantees of equal protection 
and an impartial trial.178  With roots in the Constitution and professional 
ethics, the rule against summoning the “thirteenth juror, prejudice”179 exists 
in nearly every jurisdiction,180 but courts tend to focus primarily on due 
process in applying this rule.  Regulating implicitly racial arguments has been 
 
 172. See, e.g., Werts v. Vaughn, 228 F.3d 178, 194 (3d Cir. 2000) (commenting that people 
in Werts’s neighborhood commit crimes haphazardly and often); Glenn v. Bartlett, No. 93-
CV-1394, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8669, at *12 (N.D.N.Y. June 19, 1995) (insinuating that 
Black men do not walk in affluent neighborhoods); People v. Johnson, 581 N.E.2d 118, 126 
(Ill. App. Ct. 1991) (emphasizing that the crime occurred far away from the Black defendant’s 
home on the south side of Chicago, meaning that there was “no reason for him to be there 
except to cause trouble”); People v. Nightengale, 523 N.E.2d 136, 139 (Ill. App. Ct. 1988) 
(pointing out that the defendant committed crime in “our streets,” not “some ghetto”); State v. 
Martin, 773 N.W.2d 89, 107 (Minn. 2009) (implying that Black people in north Minneapolis 
have different values and lifestyles than whites); State v. Ray, 659 N.W.2d 736, 746 (Minn. 
2003) (highlighting the differences between north Minneapolis and Golden Valley, Edina, and 
Minnetonka to emphasize that the defendants live in an unsafe “hood”); State v. Mitchell, No. 
A08-0464, 2009 WL 1047183, at *2 (Minn. Ct. App. Apr. 21, 2009) (asking “[whether the] 
white guy who’s come to buy cocaine at Sherburne and Rice is going to get an honest deal”).  
 173. State v. Monday, 257 P.3d 551, 554 (Wash. 2011) (pronouncing police as “po-leese”).  
 174. State v. Kirk, 339 P.3d 1213, 1216 (Idaho Ct. App. 2014) (reciting lines from “Dixie” 
in closing argument, which the court recognized as “an ode to the Old South, which references 
with praise a time and place for the most pernicious racism”). 
 175. State v. Scruggs, 421 N.W.2d 707, 715–16 (Minn. 1988) (referring to the defendant 
as the “one-eyed jack,” a movie character from the 1961 film One-Eyed Jacks who was known 
for his dishonesty). 
 176. Smith v. Farley, 59 F.3d 659, 664 (7th Cir. 1995).  “Super Fly” is the hero of the 1972 
movie, Super Fly, in which a Black cocaine dealer seeks to “neutralize the police by hiring the 
Mafia to kill the police commissioner’s [children]” and succeeds in getting away with his 
crimes. Id. 
 177. See generally United States v. Richardson, 161 F.3d 728 (D.C. Cir. 1998); State v. 
Cabrera, 700 N.W.2d 469 (Minn. 2005).  
 178. See Earle, supra note 100, at 1221. 
 179. Id. at 1213. 
 180. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (“[N]or shall any State deprive any person of life, 
liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor . . .  equal protection of the laws.”); id. 
amend. V (“No person shall . . . be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process 
of law . . . .”); id. amend. VI (guaranteeing an “impartial jury”); see also MODEL RULES OF 
PROF’L CONDUCT r. 3.4(e) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2013).  
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especially difficult because of challenges in prescribing the permissible use 
of subtle or coded language under legal ethics codes and standards.181 
This Part describes the methods by which courts and disciplinary 
authorities currently address racial bias in trial and analyzes the shortcomings 
of these methods.  Since many of the methods apply to both implicit and 
explicit racial biases, this Part discusses both types of biases under the 
umbrella term “racial bias” but focuses on implicit racial biases wherever 
possible. 
Part III.A discusses the various options trial courts have to control and 
remedy racially biased arguments and analyzes the problems associated with 
these options.  Next, Part III.B describes the high standards appellate courts 
use to address racial bias on appeal and discusses the problems with the 
appeals process.  Part III.C then delves into prosecutorial discipline, 
discusses the limitations of disciplinary methods, and illustrates the 
ineffectiveness of prosecutorial discipline through a case study of two erring 
prosecutors’ disciplinary proceedings. 
A.  Trial Courts in Criminal Litigation 
Since racially biased summations occur in trial courts, these courts are in 
the best position to immediately address improper arguments and to prevent 
jurors from being negatively influenced by such arguments.  This Part 
describes the methods trial courts can use to minimize harm caused by 
implicit racial biases in summations.  These methods include giving jurors 
pretrial instructions, sustaining defense counsel’s objections, reprimanding 
erring prosecutors, referring erring prosecutors to disciplinary authorities, 
offering curative instructions, or all of the above.  This Part ends with a 
discussion of the problems with trial courts’ current methods of addressing 
the manifestation of racial biases during trial. 
1.  Pretrial Jury Instructions 
Trial courts have discretion over whether to provide jury instructions and 
what those instructions include, and judges have differing opinions about 
whether implicit racial biases should be addressed in pretrial instructions.  
Some courts give jurors pretrial implicit bias instructions, and some do not. 
In Seattle and Tacoma, every prospective juror is shown an eleven-minute 
implicit bias video.182  Through examples, the video discusses the importance 
of thinking about implicit biases and aims to reduce the negative impact 
implicit biases may have in trial.183  Similarly, Judge Mark Bennett of the 
Northern District of Iowa offers implicit bias instructions in his courtroom 
 
 181. See Alfieri, supra note 113, at 1130–31. 
 182. Unconscious Bias, U.S. DISTRICT CT., W. DISTRICT WASH., http://www.wawd. 
uscourts.gov/jury/unconscious-bias [https://perma.cc/K365-QZY4] (last visited Apr. 13, 
2018). 
 183. Id.  
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before every trial begins.184  Judge Bennett recognizes that deeply rooted 
associations of Black people with violence and dangerousness exists going 
back to slavery and believes that bias persists and can be harmful.185  After 
instructing the jury about implicit biases, Judge Bennett asks jurors to sign a 
certification stating that they will not let implicit biases affect their decision.  
He acknowledges that the certification does not completely root out implicit 
biases but believes that it helps with explicit biases and that the “line between 
the two is often blurry.”186 
Other judges, like Judge Richard Kopf of the District of Nebraska, do not 
give pretrial implicit bias instructions.  Judge Kopf believes that trial judges 
should “stay out of the ‘implicit bias’ business” and that there is very little 
evidence that implicit biases can affect trials.187  He also does not think 
implicit bias warrants overt actions like those taken by Judge Bennett and 
considers Judge Bennett’s actions “authoritarianism dressed up in the guise 
of justice.”188 
2.  Objections, Curative Instructions, and Reprimands 
If a prosecutor makes racially offensive remarks about a Black defendant, 
defense counsel can immediately object.  Trial courts can then admonish or 
instruct the jury to disregard the offensive remarks.  Some courts will do this 
even if defense counsel fails to object, but most will not.  If defense counsel 
fails to object during trial, courts use the plain error doctrine, and the 
defendant is deemed to have waived his right to appeal unless the court finds 
a substantial error.189  This requirement ensures that the trial court has an 
opportunity to correct the error, places the misconduct on record for the 
appellate court to review, and prevents the defendant from raising the error 
only if the trial court does not rule in his favor.190 
After sustaining an objection, judges can verbally reprimand the erring 
prosecutor and remedy improper racial arguments by instructing the jury “in 
such a manner as to erase the taint of improper remarks that are made.”191  If 
the judge determines that a part of the evidence is inadmissible, she may use 
an “instruction to disregard,” which tells jurors not to consider the racial 
 
 184. Mark W. Bennett, Unraveling the Gordian Knot of Implicit Bias in Jury Selection:  
The Problems of Judge-Dominated Voir Dire, the Failed Promise of Batson, and Proposed 
Solutions, 4 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 149, 169 n.85 (2010).  
 185. Mark W. Bennett, Dueling Judges:  A Judge’s Duty to Deal with Implicit Bias, 
MIMESIS LAW (Nov. 16, 2016), http://mimesislaw.com/fault-lines/dueling-judges-a-judges-
duty-to-deal-with-implicit-bias/14262#_ftn3 [https://perma.cc/RAP6-92RU].  
 186. Id. 
 187. Richard Kopf, Dueling Judges:  Jurors Should Be Free From “Judicial 
Immunization” for “Implicit Bias,” MIMESIS LAW (Nov. 16, 2016), 
http://mimesislaw.com/fault-lines/dueling-judges-jurors-should-be-free-from-judicial-
immunization-for-implicit-bias/14260 [https://perma.cc/35AE-J3JJ].  
 188. Id. 
 189. See Caldwell, supra note 120, at 87. 
 190. Brooks Holland, Race and Ambivalent Criminal Procedure Remedies, 47 GONZ. L. 
REV. 341, 351 (2011).  
 191. United States v. Modica, 663 F.2d 1173, 1185 (2d Cir. 1981). 
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evidence that they have already been exposed to.192  The judge may also issue 
a “limiting instruction,” which tells jurors not to use a particular piece of 
evidence to draw a certain racial inference, although they are free to use the 
evidence in other ways.193 
Typically, curative instructions given following a problematic argument 
are general statements that do not explain the instruction’s basis.194  After 
issuing curative instructions, trial courts can also send transcripts of improper 
arguments to disciplinary authorities.195 
3. Problems with How Trial Courts Address Racial Bias 
Trial courts’ approaches to rectifying prosecutorial use of racial arguments 
have largely ignored implicit racial biases.196  This is partly because implicit 
racial references face the additional hurdle of first having to be recognized as 
racial references.  Trial courts need to be able to link the prosecutor’s 
improper statements to the defendant’s race before even beginning to 
evaluate the statements’ prejudicial content.197  This is challenging for some 
courts as they may not recognize the racially coded language and various 
stereotypes that can be used to trigger implicit racial biases. 
Trial courts do not give defendants a fair chance to redress implicit racial 
biases as the remedies are largely conditioned on the actions of other people.  
If lawyers and judges do not recognize arguments that may appeal to jurors’ 
implicit racial biases, Black defendants suffer.  If defense counsel fails to 
object to a subtle racial argument immediately or is afraid of being accused 
of playing the “race card,”198 the defendant may lose his right to appeal on 
that ground.  While the plain error doctrine may make sense for explicit racial 
arguments,199 it takes away the appellate court’s opportunity to remedy an 
implicit bias error that may have been overlooked by defense counsel. 
The nonuniform manner in which judges address implicit racial biases in 
pretrial instructions could lead to vastly different outcomes for Black 
defendants.  Judges who do not give pretrial jury instructions could be 
negatively affecting juror impartiality as perceptions are difficult to change 
after opinions have been formed.200  Even when jury instructions are given, 
they may not be effective as they are often not based on procedural justice.201  
 
 192. David Alan Sklansky, Evidentiary Instructions and the Jury as Other, 65 STAN. L. 
REV. 407, 408 (2013).  
 193. Id.  
 194. See, e.g., State v. McCail, 565 S.E.2d 96, 103 (N.C. Ct. App. 2002) (“Excuse me, 
[prosecutor].  Ladies and gentlemen of the jury, you’re to disregard counsel’s characterization 
of the defendant.”). 
 195. Bruce A. Green, Prosecutorial Ethics in Retrospect, 30 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 461, 
478 (2017). 
 196. See Johnson, supra note 129, at 1779. 
 197. See Earle, supra note 100, at 1239. 
 198. See supra text accompanying note 55.  
 199. See supra note 190 and accompanying text. 
 200. See Elizabeth Ingriselli, Note, Mitigating Jurors’ Racial Biases:  The Effects of 
Content and Timing of Jury Instructions, 124 YALE L.J. 1690, 1714–15 (2015).  
 201. Id. at 1697 (“According to [procedural justice] theory, individuals view the justice 
system as legitimate if the process by which it reaches outcomes is perceived to be fair.”). 
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Instructions based on procedural justice have been found to diminish biases 
because the instructions allow jurors to view their decision-making as fair 
and jurors will thus better comply with the ideal of impartial decision-
making.202 
Like pretrial instructions, curative instructions also vary greatly between 
courts.  While some courts may issue instructions sua sponte, others only do 
so if defense counsel objects in a timely manner and the court sustains the 
objection.203  Failure to give curative instructions sua sponte is rarely deemed 
an error.204  Thus, in some jurisdictions, racial bias will not be addressed 
unless defense counsel raises a timely objection, regardless of the severity of 
a racial comment, or the trial court recognizes the comment as prejudicial.  
Additionally, although the criminal justice system relies heavily on these 
instructions to work and courts are meant to presume that juries follow these 
instructions,205 many courts do not issue them.  This is because some judges 
think that these instructions are ineffective and only aggravate the problem 
they are meant to solve.206 
The limited use of sua sponte instructions and the negative attitude toward 
curative instructions207 could allow comments that trigger implicit racial 
biases to go unaddressed.  Even when issued, most judges’ instructions do 
not directly address prosecutors’ improper conduct.  Instead, the instructions 
shift the burden to jurors and do not incentivize prosecutors to refrain from 
using language that may trigger jurors’ implicit biases. 
Researchers have found that jurors are likely to follow instructions and 
control their biases if they receive instructions that emphasize fairness and 
stress the importance of recognizing racial biases.208  Even when curative 
instructions are issued, they are not always effective as they often are not 
based on procedural justice and do not explain their underlying reasons.  If 
jurors are not given instructions, or are given incomprehensible, seemingly 
baseless instructions, they are more likely to apply their own norms and 
 
 202. Id. at 1714. 
 203. Compare State v. McCail, 565 S.E.2d 96, 103 (N.C. Ct. App. 2002) (giving a curative 
instruction ex mero motu), with Toler v. State, 95 So. 3d 913, 916 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2012) 
(sustaining the objection but declining to give a curative instruction).  
 204. See, e.g., State v. Athan, 158 P.3d 27, 41 (Wash. 2007) (observing that “the failure of 
a court to give a limiting instruction is not error when no instruction was requested”).  
 205. See Alex Kozinski, Criminal Law 2.0, 44 GEO. L.J. ANN. REV. CRIM. PROC. iii, viii 
(2015).  
 206. See Caldwell, supra note 120, at 84–85; see also Alfieri, supra note 113, at 1160 
(noting that “lines crossed will never be uncrossed”).  Justice Robert H. Jackson believed 
evidentiary instructions are a “naïve assumption” and Judge Learned Hand thought 
“[instructions are] a mental gymnastic which is beyond, not only [the jurors’] powers, but 
anybody’s else.” Sklansky, supra note 192, at 408–09 (quoting Nash v. United States, 54 F.2d 
1006, 1007 (2d Cir. 1932)). 
 207. See Sklansky, supra note 192, at 408–12 (describing various other judges’ skepticism 
about curative instructions). 
 208. See Ingriselli, supra note 200, at 1699.  
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standards to decision-making.209  This could lead to unconstrained 
functioning of jurors’ implicit racial biases.210 
B.  Appellate Courts in Criminal Litigation 
After a defendant has successfully preserved his right to appeal, the 
appellate court can rectify errors caused by improper racial references.211  
Like trial courts, appellate courts also impose procedural barriers that make 
it nearly impossible for defendants to successfully challenge prosecutorial 
misconduct in closing arguments, especially when subtle racial references are 
used.212  This Part discusses factors considered when appellate courts decide 
to reverse or remand due to improper racial references.  It also examines the 
various procedural devices appellate courts use to explain their frequent 
inaction and minimization of racial references’ adverse effects.  It then 
explores how appellate courts can use their written opinions to informally 
discipline prosecutors, and it ends with an analysis of the problems and 
limitations of the existing appellate process for addressing racial bias. 
1.  Reversing and Remanding Cases 
If an appellate court deems a prosecutor’s racial comment improper, the 
court may remand the case to a lower court or reverse the defendant’s 
conviction.  Courts are reluctant to do this because of the high social costs 
involved.213  Thus, appellate courts analyze prosecutors’ improper racial 
comments under high constitutional and nonconstitutional error standards.214  
The critical question in deciding whether a constitutional violation has 
occurred is whether the prosecutor’s conduct adversely affected the 
defendant’s right to an impartial jury or equal protection by drawing attention 
to a characteristic that the Constitution generally demands that the jury 
ignore.215  The standard for determining if an error is harmless is whether the 
error “affect[ed] the substantial rights of the accused.”216  Courts have held 
that the Fourteenth Amendment is not implicated by closing arguments with 
“irrelevant negative characterizations” of defendants rather than appeals to 
jurors’ racial prejudice, which further limits the harmless error standard.217 
Appellate courts often consider prosecutors’ subtle racial references as 
“negative characterizations” and, thus, do not recognize them as 
problematic.218  Even if courts recognize these comments as problematic, 
 
 209. See Sklansky, supra note 192, at 438, 446 (recommending that judges give clear jury 
instructions that explain their purpose). 
 210. See supra notes 80–81 and accompanying text.  
 211. See supra Part III.A.2. 
 212. See Bowman, supra note 114, at 315. 
 213. Smith v. Farley, 59 F.3d 659, 664 (7th Cir. 1995); see also Earle, supra note 100, at 
1228.  
 214. See Lyon, supra note 109, at 321. 
 215. See McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 292–93 (1987); see also supra note 180. 
 216. Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 82 (1935).  
 217. See Alford, supra note 94, at 337. 
 218. See, e.g., State v. Martin, 773 N.W.2d 89, 107 (Minn. 2009); State v. Paul, 716 N.W.2d 
329, 338–39 (Minn. 2006); State v. Berube, 286 P.3d 402, 407–08 (Wash. Ct. App. 2012). 
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they are mostly unwilling to declare the comments alone to be reversible 
error.219  Courts only reverse or remand cases when racial comments are 
especially egregious or multiple errors are found.220  Thus, when a prosecutor 
makes improper racial references during his summation, the defendant’s 
chance of remedying any unfair effects is “directly proportional to the 
transparency” of the racial comments.221 
2.  Methods Used to Downplay Racial Significance 
Even when appellate courts recognize the racial aspects of summations, 
they tend to dismiss or narrowly frame the racial comments.  This is likely 
because courts do not fully appreciate the unfair impact implicitly racial 
arguments can have on trial outcomes for Black defendants or on society at 
large.222 
Some courts go to great lengths to justify prosecutors’ racial remarks as 
relevant or not clearly racial.  For example, several cases note that remarks 
about sexual relations between Black men and white women are not 
prejudicial because jurors can see the actors’ races.223  Courts also try to find 
“factual relevance” when a prosecutor subtly references race.224  Courts often 
argue that subtle references are “merely descriptive” and are unwilling to 
recognize the impact the references could have on jurors’ implicit biases.225 
Although inappropriate racial comments may occur regardless of what 
other evidence indicates about the defendant and regardless of whether the 
comments were deliberate or unintentional, courts sometimes scrutinize the 
prosecutor’s intent to determine whether a comment had a negative racial 
implication.226  If the court does not find any indication that the prosecutor 
intentionally designed his argument to appeal to jury prejudice, the court will 
generally refuse to label the challenged comment as prejudicial.227  Although 
this allows courts to address flagrant references to race, less obvious 
references have mostly been deemed neutral and harmless, regardless of the 
effect on the listener.228 
Courts are also reluctant to find that racial remarks have prejudiced a trial 
when they believe that other evidence weighs against the defendant.229  
Courts often use this analysis to find that a defendant has not been prejudiced 
 
 219. See, e.g., State v. Blanks, 479 N.W.2d 601, 602 (Iowa Ct. App. 1991).  
 220. See, e.g., State v. Kirk, 339 P.3d 1213, 1218–19 (Idaho Ct. App. 2014); Blanks, 479 
N.W.2d at 605. 
 221. See Alford, supra note 94, at 337. 
 222. See supra text accompanying note 24.  
 223. See Johnson, supra note 129, at 1784 n.217.  But see supra Part II.D.  
 224. See Earle, supra note 100, at 1231. 
 225. See supra Part I.B.1.  
 226. See Earle, supra note 100, at 1218.  
 227. Id. at 1224. 
 228. See, e.g., United States v. Martinez, Nos. 89-5805, 89-6301, 1991 U.S. App. LEXIS 
11011, at *4 (4th Cir. May 31, 1991); In re Pers. Restraint of Gentry, 316 P.3d 1020, 1031 
(Wash. 2014); State v. Berube, 286 P.3d 402, 407–08 (Wash. Ct. App. 2012). 
 229. See Lyon, supra note 109, at 330–33; see also Calhoun v. United States, 568 U.S. 
1206 (2013); Darden v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 168, 192 (1986).  
3116 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 86 
by a prosecutor’s racial arguments, even if those arguments have an easily 
inferable prejudicial effect on the jury.230  This approach moves the emphasis 
from the fairness of the proceeding to the guilt of the defendant.231 
Moreover, courts are disinclined to decide that a single or a few racial 
references may taint an entire trial.  Courts thus examine the full record and 
count the number of perceived racial references to minimize the impact that 
the racial references may have on the trial outcome.232  Regardless of how 
explicit a racial reference may be, most courts will explain away the reference 
or view it as neutral by reasoning that it is an “isolated” reference and thus 
could not have had a significant impact on the jury.233 
3.  Court Opinions as Informal Reprimands 
Regardless of whether a case is reversed or remanded, if an appellate court 
deems a prosecutor’s racial comment improper or inappropriate, the court can 
use its written opinion to highlight the comment’s impropriety.  The Supreme 
Court has also stated that an informal way to reprimand prosecutors for 
improper conduct is to “publically chastise[] the prosecutor by identifying 
him in [the court’s opinion].”234  Publicly identifying the prosecutor in an 
opinion taints the prosecutor’s reputation and acts as a threat to other 
prosecutors.235  This is also useful to disciplinary authorities as they 
sometimes learn of prosecutors’ improper arguments from appellate 
decisions.236 
Courts occasionally deem a prosecutor’s racial comment regrettable or 
improper.  For example, in Calhoun v. United States,237 although the 
prosecutor used a fairly explicit and easy-to-detect racial reference, the court 
declined to grant the defendant’s cert petition.  Instead, Justice Sotomayor 
verbally reprimanded the prosecutor, faulted him for “tapp[ing] a deep and 
sorry vein of racial prejudice that has run through the history of criminal 
justice in our Nation,”238 and stated that she “hope[s] never to see a case like 
this again.”239 
 
 230. See Earle, supra note 100, at 1227. 
 231. See id. at 1228.  
 232. Id. 
 233. See Lyon, supra note 109, at 326. 
 234. Adam M. Gershowitz, Prosecutorial Shaming:  Naming Attorneys to Reduce 
Prosecutorial Misconduct, 42 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1059, 1068 (2009) (quoting United States 
v. Hasting, 461 U.S. 499, 506 n.5 (1974)). 
 235. Reputation is considered to be the “most valuable commodity” in the legal profession. 
See id. at 1090–91; see also Kozinski, supra note 205, at xxxvi (“Naming names and taking 
prosecutors to task for misbehavior can have magical qualities in assuring compliance with 
constitutional rights.”).  
 236. See Green, supra note 195, at 478. 
 237. 568 U.S. 1206 (2013) (Sotomayor, J., statement respecting denial of petition for writ 
of certiorari). 
 238. Id. at 1208. 
 239. Id. at 1209. 
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4.  Problems with How Appellate Courts Address Racial Bias 
Appellate courts do not often remedy the use of implicit racial bias in 
prosecutorial summations.  They focus heavily on the fairness of outcomes 
and, thus, do not fully consider the equal protection implications of racial 
bias use in summations.  Even when appellate courts remedy improper racial 
arguments, they show their ambivalence by conditioning remedies on 
whether the defendant preserved the error through objection and whether the 
defendant has established that the argument resulted in prejudice.240  
Additionally, most cases where improper arguments are remedied have the 
same narrow view of “racism and racist imagery that permeates the cases 
which are affirmed.”241  Reversing courts often highlight the fact that 
offensive remarks were not isolated and analyze the remarks as part of 
extended discussions.242 
Often, appellate courts are not even aware of the full extent of racial 
comments made during summations as the cold record on appeal leaves out 
important details and context regarding improper racial references used 
during trial.243  Although the transcript reflects words, it does not convey a 
sense of timing, intonation, or juror reaction.244  Thus, appellate courts cannot 
fully measure the effect of racial comments on the jury. 
Appellate courts also use various methods and devices to minimize racial 
arguments that do make it onto the record, especially if the arguments are 
subtle.  This largely ignores implicitly racial arguments.  The already high 
harmless error standard is even more difficult to meet when prosecutors’ 
arguments appeal to implicit racial biases because it is challenging to 
measure subtle arguments’ effect on jurors.  Jurors themselves may not be 
aware of their biases or be cognizant of how the prosecutors’ arguments may 
affect their decision-making.245  Similarly, categorizing racial remarks as 
merely descriptive ignores the vast literature on the existence and activation 
of implicit biases.246  By making an argument with underlying implicit racial 
biases, prosecutors solicit a judgment based on status that goes beyond the 
evidence and the issue of the defendant’s conduct.247   
While considering the relevance of a statement can be important in some 
situations, appellate courts often do not fully examine the underlying 
connotations of remarks that could appeal to jurors’ implicit biases.248  The 
intent-based approach also fails to consider the use of implicit racial biases 
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as these biases do not manifest consciously.249  It is almost impossible to 
ascertain whether a prosecutor intended to make a comment that triggers 
jurors’ implicit biases.  In addition, the prosecutor’s intent “is of little or no 
importance in assessing the impact of racial imagery on the jury.”250  Thus, 
the question should not be one of intent but one of effect.  Even if motives 
should matter, racial motives may encompass more than explicit racial 
animosity.251  The fact that some courts find subtle racial arguments plausible 
suggests that the jurors might find them persuasive.252 
The evidence-weighted approach253 can result in inconsistent standards 
and allow for unconstrained use of explicit and implicit racial biases if the 
evidence against the defendant is significant.254  The evidence-weighted 
approach fails to recognize that, although injustice is greater when it harms 
the innocent, subtle racial arguments are unjust even when used against the 
guilty as everyone is entitled to the Constitution’s full protection.255 
Although courts can use their opinions to deter future misconduct, they 
often do not do so.  Most opinions do not name the erring prosecutor.256  
Instead, judges go to great lengths to redact the names of misbehaving 
prosecutors.  This not only unnecessarily immunizes erring prosecutors but 
also may hinder disciplinary authorities from being able to recognize and 
punish the prosecutors.257  Thus, appellate courts usually fail to cure the harm 
done to the affected defendant, uphold defendants’ right to equal protection, 
informally discipline erring prosecutors, or even disincentivize future 
misconduct.  Appellate courts’ ambivalence toward racial comments and 
efforts to minimize the comments’ importance may also signal to trial courts 
and lawyers that they do not need to take the use of implicit racial biases in 
summations seriously. 
C.  Formally Disciplining Prosecutors 
When prosecutors err, courts prefer professional discipline over 
adjudicatory remedies, such as reversal of criminal convictions,258 as those 
remedies are often unavailable.259  Prosecutorial misconduct, including the 
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use of racial references during closing argument, can constitute ethical 
violations and expose erring prosecutors to disciplinary action.260 
1.  Scope of Prosecutorial Discipline 
When the Supreme Court immunized prosecutors from civil liability, the 
Court assumed that discipline would be adequate to deter misconduct.261  
State courts and disciplinary bodies have the authority to discipline 
lawyers.262  This discipline is intended to protect the public and the courts 
and to deter other lawyers from engaging in similar misconduct.263  
Discipline can take many forms, including private reprimands, public 
reprimands, suspension from practicing law for a period of time, or 
permanent disbarment from practicing law.  Erring lawyers may also be 
charged the cost of the disciplinary proceeding.264 
As a first step, judges may choose to reprimand erring prosecutors on the 
spot or after the jury has left the courtroom.265  Judges may also file formal 
grievances to assess the need for disciplinary proceedings or initiate 
proceedings to suspend the prosecutor from practice if the prosecutor has 
committed persistent misconduct.266 
The American Bar Association’s Model Rule 8.4 lays out behavior 
considered to be professional misconduct.  Professional misconduct occurs 
when lawyers violate or attempt to violate a Model Rule267 or when they 
“engage in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice.”268  
Model Rule 8.4 gives courts wide latitude to find that prosecutors’ racial 
arguments undermine the fairness of the adversarial process.269 
Although making racial arguments violates numerous rules of professional 
conduct,270 courts often interpret rules less restrictively to give prosecutors 
the benefit of the doubt.271  For example, implicitly racial arguments arguably 
violate Model Rule 3.4(e), which disallows alluding to irrelevant matters and 
matters not supported by admissible evidence or “stat[ing] a personal opinion 
as to the justness of a cause.”272  Implicitly racial arguments are rarely 
relevant or supported by evidence, can be seen as personal opinions, and are 
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prejudicial to the administration of justice,273 but the rule is rarely interpreted 
in this way. 
2.  Limitations of Prosecutorial Discipline 
Prosecutors are rarely disciplined for their misconduct.274  In the past, 
judges did not address improper closing arguments either because they did 
not notice impermissible arguments or because they assumed that prosecutors 
were acting within their limits.275  Today, courts often refuse to discipline or 
sanction erring prosecutors even if they find that defense counsel properly 
objected to racial arguments and that the prosecutor committed 
misconduct.276  Discipline of erring prosecutors is still mostly limited to 
cases involving patently illegal conduct such as embezzlement, bribery, or 
extortion.277  Prosecutorial discipline is so rare that Judge Alex Kozinski 
believes that the U.S. Justice Department’s Office of Professional 
Responsibility (OPR) unfairly protects erring prosecutors and suggests that 
OPR be moved to an independent office.278 
Prosecutorial misconduct involving implicit racial biases is rarely 
punished, partly because there is no rule directly addressing it.279  Some have 
argued for a rule addressing implicit biases by reasoning that individuals 
should be held responsible for the real-world implications that can result from 
their implicit racial biases.280  It would likely be difficult to garner enough 
support for such a rule, however.  Others have argued that it is not fair to 
punish prosecutors for implicit racial biases regardless of resulting actions 
since the biases are not conscious and improper arguments are not 
“intended.”281 
Regardless of whether a new rule should be enacted, giving prosecutors 
the benefit of the doubt when they make subtle racial arguments immunizes 
those who routinely use their closing arguments to trigger racial stereotypes 
or animus in the jury.282  Although misconduct is not only committed by “bad 
 
 273. See supra Part I.  
 274. See Caldwell, supra note 120, at 54; see also An Epidemic of Prosecutor Misconduct, 
supra note 264, at 8.  Nine studies analyzing the professional consequences of prosecutor 
misconduct between 1963 and 2013 identified 3625 instances of misconduct.  Public sanctions 
were only imposed in sixty-three cases and often included just a “slap-of-the-wrist.”  An 
Epidemic of Prosecutor Misconduct, supra note 264, at 8. 
 275. Bruce Green & Ellen Yaroshefsky, Prosecutorial Accountability 2.0, 92 NOTRE DAME 
L. REV. 51, 63 (2016). 
 276. See Bowman, supra note 114, at 315. 
 277. See Green & Levine, supra note 258, at 156 (discussing Fred C. Zacharias, The 
Professional Discipline of Prosecutors, 79 N.C. L. REV. 721 (2001)). 
 278. See Kozinski, supra note 205, at xxxii.  Judge Kozinski also recommends that similar 
independent offices be instituted in every state. Id. 
 279. Jessica Blakemore, Implicit Racial Bias and Public Defenders, 29 GEO. J. LEGAL 
ETHICS 833, 841 (2016). 
 280. Jules Holroyd, Implicit Bias, Awareness and Imperfect Cognitions, 33 
CONSCIOUSNESS & COGNITION 511, 515 (2015) (arguing that reasonable people should be able 
to be observationally aware of behavioral aspects that may result in discriminatory effects 
because of their biases). 
 281. See Roberts, supra note 79, at 876.  
 282. Blakemore, supra note 279, at 841–42.  
2018] RACIAL BIASES IN PROSECUTORS’ SUMMATIONS 3121 
apples,”283 any perceived unfairness toward erring prosecutors is outweighed 
by the unfair impact these arguments can have on Black defendants.284  While 
prosecutors are rarely sanctioned and almost never disbarred,285 defendants 
may receive far worse consequences, including the death penalty.286 
3.  The Reality:  Discipline in Bennett and Monday 
Even when courts reverse convictions and recognize prosecutorial 
misconduct involving improper racial language in summations, erring 
prosecutors are not adequately disciplined.  This Part illustrates this 
inadequacy through an examination of prosecutorial discipline in Bennett v. 
Stirling287 and State v. Monday.288 
Donald Myers, the prosecutor in Bennett, earned the nickname “Doctor 
Death” because of his record-setting pursuit of executions.289  He was also 
known for his repeated misconduct.  Bennett was not the first time one of 
Myers’s death sentence “wins” was reversed due to misconduct.290  Twelve 
of the twenty-eight defendants prosecuted by Myers have had their death 
sentences overturned, two of which were reversed directly because of 
Myers’s misconduct.291  Despite this, Myers has only received a private 
reprimand from the state bar for his many acts of misconduct.292  Myers’s 
career ended only when he voluntarily retired because he was approaching 
the mandatory retirement age.293 
Like Myers, the prosecutor in Monday, James Konat, was not adequately 
disciplined.294  After Konat used improper racial arguments during trial, the 
court rebuked him and referred him to the Washington State Bar Authority 
Disciplinary Board.  Konat went on paid leave after sending a letter to his 
coworkers apologizing for his “poor judgment.”295  The disciplinary board 
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found Konat’s use of the “anti-snitch code” intentional but did not find his 
pronunciation of “po-leese” as having any racial connotations.296  Although 
the hearing officer found that Konat “employed an unacceptable racial 
stereotype . . . that was prejudicial to the administration of justice” and 
deserved a presumptive sanction of suspension, the officer recommended that 
the sanction be mitigated to a reprimand—a much lesser punishment.297  One 
of the mitigating factors found was “absence of a prior disciplinary 
record,”298 even though Konat had previously been accused of 
misconduct.299  Again, like Myers, Konat was not fired.  Instead, he too chose 
to resign.300 
Both Bennett and Monday were reversed and received extensive media 
coverage.  Still, the erring prosecutors were barely affected.  They were not 
shamed, were given paid leave, and were allowed to retire on their own terms.  
In cases without such clear error or as much media attention, it is unclear 
what, if any, discipline other prosecutors may face for similar transgressions. 
IV.  BENDING THE ARC TOWARD JUSTICE:  PROPOSING AN INTEGRATED 
RESPONSE TO IMPLICITLY RACIAL PROSECUTORIAL SUMMATIONS 
Parts I and II of this Note highlighted an important but often overlooked 
type of racial bias used in trials involving Black defendants:  prosecutorial 
summations involving implicit racial biases.301  Part III concluded that courts 
and disciplinary authorities do not fully recognize the problem of implicitly 
racial arguments and do not adequately remedy or deter implicitly biased 
prosecutorial summations. 
While acknowledging that it is not possible to cure the centuries of 
stereotyping that led to the formation and functioning of implicit racial 
biases,302 this Part proposes an integrated response involving lawyers, jurors, 
and judges to better address the use of implicitly racial references in 
prosecutorial summations.  An integrated response is needed as each actor in 
the trial process plays a significant role in deterring the use of arguments 
drawing on implicit racial biases303 and no single approach focusing on a 
specific part of the trial process will adequately address the issue. 
Part IV.A discusses the importance of recognizing that racially biased 
summations are not only a due process issue but also implicate broader equal 
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protection concerns.  Next, Part IV.B proposes that the various actors in the 
criminal justice system be educated about implicit racial biases so that they 
can effectively perform their part in deterring improper arguments.  Finally, 
Part IV.C calls on courts to better address prosecutors’ use of implicit racial 
biases in summations and suggests methods by which courts can do so.  The 
suggestions include issuing better instructions and verbally reprimanding 
prosecutors at the trial level, as well as shaming prosecutors and trial judges 
at the appellate level. 
A.  Implicitly Racial Summations Should Be Recognized 
As More Than a Due Process Issue 
Improper racial summations are not merely rhetorical slips.  They not only 
affect the defendant’s right to a fair trial; they also have lingering effects on 
society.304  While U.S. society has been trying to rid itself of enduring racial 
stereotypes, these efforts have proven difficult because of the challenges 
associated with policing private speech.  Since the legal system is premised 
on equality and fairness and courts use public resources, courts are in a good 
position to police language used in the courtroom.  Unfortunately, as 
discussed in Part III, courts currently treat the use of implicit racial biases in 
summations as a problem of due process and focus primarily on the fairness 
of trial outcomes.305  This allows for courts to use procedural devices to 
minimize the problem, which perpetuates negative stereotypes about Black 
people and hinders the broader societal effort to move the racial arc closer to 
justice.306  Courts should thus try harder to regulate racial speech in the 
courtroom and refrain from explaining away racial comments,307 ignoring 
“isolated” comments,308 and categorizing racial comments as merely 
“negative characterizations.”309  Instead, courts should focus on the potential 
impact racial comments can have—both on the defendant and on society at 
large—and begin to recognize the use of implicit racial biases in summations 
as improper regardless of whether the error is procedurally “harmless.”310 
B.  Lawyers, Judges, and Jurors Should Be Trained 
About Implicit Racial Biases 
Each actor in the criminal justice system plays an important role in 
regulating improper racial summations.  When prosecutors inject implicit 
racial biases into their arguments, the harmful effects can only be effectively 
addressed if the impropriety is recognized and immediately tackled so unfair 
stereotypes do not taint jurors’ decision-making or inform their out-of-court 
behavior.311  As such, prosecutors, defense counsel, and judges need to be 
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able to recognize implicit racial biases and jurors need to understand how 
implicit biases can undermine the fairness of the legal system and perpetuate 
inequality.312 
To reduce implicit racial biases’ unfair effects, lawyers, judges, and jurors 
must be made aware of the existence and functioning of implicit racial biases, 
including their own.  This will make it more likely that these actors will work 
toward controlling their biases and be cognizant of the impact implicit biases 
may have on their actions.313  Lawyers and judges can be trained through 
mandatory continuing legal education (CLE) courses,314 and jurors can be 
educated about implicit biases through pretrial instructions.  Pretrial implicit 
bias instructions should be issued uniformly as they can help prevent biased 
decision-making.  These instructions should be based on procedural justice, 
specifically discuss how implicit racial biases can be manifested, and account 
for the adverse effects these biases can have on the defendant as well as on 
societal racial justice.315  The instructions should also emphasize the 
importance of closing arguments and caution the jury to pay close attention 
to the references made at that phase of trial.316 
Additionally, criminal defense lawyers, prosecutors, and judges should be 
trained to recognize implicit racial themes, such as those outlined in Part II.  
The CLEs should include the historical basis of the seemingly innocuous 
racial language so that lawyers and judges better understand the negative 
connotations and consequences of such language.317  This will allow for well-
meaning prosecutors to stay away from making such improper arguments, 
for defense lawyers to be more likely to preserve defendants’ rights to appeal 
by being able to recognize and immediately object to improper arguments, 
and for judges to be able to effectively explain the basis of their instructions 
to the jury. 
C.  Courts Should Use Instructions and Judicial Opinions to Deter 
Implicitly Racial Prosecutorial Summations 
Since courts are reluctant to reverse cases,318 prosecutors are rarely 
disciplined,319 and a model rule directly addressing implicit biases will be 
difficult to enact,320 courts should use other methods within their authority to 
dissuade prosecutors from making implicitly racial summations.  In cases 
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with Black defendants, trial judges should be more willing to immediately 
respond to implicitly racial arguments made during summation.  In such 
cases, failure to issue sua sponte instructions should be an error so that judges 
can address improper summations irrespective of whether the defense 
counsel acts appropriately.321 
Judges’ curative instructions should be comprehensive and should 
informally discipline erring prosecutors.  Curative instructions should not just 
be general statements to disregard or limit certain evidence but should 
include specific reasons about why the argument has been deemed 
improperly racial.322  Judges should thus be prepared to describe what 
implicit associations and stereotypes the improper argument may draw.  By 
highlighting the prosecutor’s improper racial comments and explaining the 
reasons for the comments’ impropriety in open court, judges will be 
damaging the prosecutor’s reputation, which may prevent him from using 
similar references again.323 
Appellate courts should stop using procedural devices to minimize the 
impact of racial comments and should make it clear that implicitly racial 
arguments will not be tolerated, regardless of the trial’s overall fairness or 
outcome.  In doing so, appellate courts should not only publicly rebuke erring 
prosecutors but also trial judges who do not adequately address the use of 
implicit biases in summations. 
Courts should also start taking the Supreme Court’s directive to “shame 
and name” prosecutors seriously.324  Judicial opinions should prominently 
display erring prosecutors’ names.  These opinions should be circulated in 
law newspapers and recorded for future disciplinary use.  This will allow 
courts to keep track of prosecutors who repeatedly make arguments that 
could trigger implicit racial biases, even if the prosecutors are not referred to 
disciplinary authorities.  Courts should determine a limit to the number of 
times a prosecutor’s name may appear in the record before the prosecutor 
will be referred to disciplinary authorities.  And disciplinary authorities 
should be more willing to appropriately punish an erring prosecutor with 
multiple recorded acts of misconduct.325 
This proposed system will protect prosecutors who unconsciously make 
arguments that could trigger implicit racial biases, but it will also punish 
repeat offenders who have been put on notice for their impropriety and, thus, 
should serve to better regulate their comments.326  It will also likely dissuade 
prosecutors from making similar arguments and committing misconduct, if 
only because of the threat of having their reputations ruined.327  Indeed, 
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verbally reprimanding and recording past accusations of misconduct may 
have prevented the misconduct in Bennett and Monday.328 
CONCLUSION 
The U.S. legal system is not effectively playing its part in addressing the 
use of implicit racial biases in prosecutorial summations.  Social 
psychologists have recognized the severe impact these biases can have on 
trial outcomes and on the perpetuation of racial injustice, but courts and 
disciplinary authorities do not adequately address or deter their use.  
Although no solution can erase centuries’ worth of stereotyping, the legal 
system should respond to the problem with an integrated approach to deter 
prosecutors from making summations that could trigger jurors’ implicit 
biases.  Courts should first recognize the equal protection implications of the 
problem as it is not only a due process issue.  Since implicit biases are 
malleable, lawyers, judges, and jurors should be trained to recognize and 
understand implicit racial biases.  This will allow them to control their own 
biases, recognize and object to biases inserted into summations, and 
informally discipline erring prosecutors.  Courts should use their authority to 
deter prosecutors’ racial speech, even if manifested as implicit racial biases.  
Courts can do so by issuing better pretrial and curative instructions, using 
their written opinions to shame prosecutors, and rebuking trial judges who 
do not appropriately address the use of implicit racial biases.  This integrated 
response will not fully prevent or cure the problem of implicitly racial 
summations, but it will help to deter future misconduct and to bend the arc of 
the moral universe closer to justice. 
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